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THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION WHERE HIS EMPLOYER MISREPRESENTED THE PROPERTY
By

WILLIAM L.

RANSOM

Justice of the City Court of the City of New York.
This article deals with a phase of the troublesome question as
to the right of a real estate broker to recover commissions upon
transactions which fail of consummation through his employer's
act or fault. The issue here discussed is, more particularly,
whether a broker who has brought his principal and a prospective
purchaser to agreeient upon all essential terms of the contemplated contract of sale on the one hand and purchase on the other,
is nevertheless barred from recovery, in the Courts of this State,
by the development (1) that the owner, in stating to the broker
the terms on which he would be .willing to sell the property and
on which the broker was to find a purchaser, also greatly misstated some material fact affecting the attractiveness of the property as a business venture-for example, the rentals currentiy received therefrom; (2) that the prospective purchaser, produced
as a result of the labors of the broker, had, in indicating his readiness to buy upon the indicated terms, based his acceptance on the
rental figures fraudulently or mistakenly given the broker by the
owner; (3) that in consequence the purchaser procured by the
broker refused to sign a contract which would compel him to pay
the agreed price for property yielding less than the represented
rentals; and (4) that in consequence no contract was signed, no
transaction consummated, and the broker's efforts went for nought.
Doubtless it will be surprising to the reader of this article, as
it was to me, to find that this question, so likely to arise with frequency in the multitudinous realty transactions of a great metropolis, has not been clearly or authoritatively determined in the
Courts of New York State. There is every reason why it might
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be expected that such a question would long ago have been decided
beyond a doubt in this jurisdiction. Of the ninety-three billion
dollars of assessed valuation of real property in the United States,
eight billion dollars represents property in New York City and
thirteen billions represents property in New York State-nine per
cent. of the total realty value in the United States is located in
New York City, fourteen per cent. in New York State. More
than half of New York City's nine per cent. is situated on a single
island which once was sold for twenty-four dollars. On the basis
either of their number or of the value of the property involved, a
very large percentage of the total real estate transactions, by way
of sale or rental, in the whole United States in any year, take
place within the limited area of New York City and the New York
State counties immediately contiguous thereto. By reason of a
number of conditions which need not be dwelt upon in detail, the
question indicated at the opening of this article is likely to arise
with greater frequency in the metropolitan real estate market than
anywhere else in the United States, and there is no community
in which it is of greater importance that the law of the subject
should be authoritatively decided and clearly expressed. Nevertheless, in spite of all these circumstances, more than a doubt remains as to the New York rule, and although I think I have a
clear concept of the trend of decision and of the eventual ruling
which will probably be made, it cannot be said that an attorney
may yet advise his client with certainty and confidence that the
ultimate holding will grant or deny to the broker a right of action
against the mis-representing owner. The importance of the question in this metropolitan community and the confusion which has
arisen concerning it, seem to warrant an effort, even at length, to
analyze the authorities and reach a conclusion as to the better supported rule.
At the outset, it may be of aid to point out that the confusion
and doubt in the New York law of the subject seem to arise from
the atmosphere of metropolitan real estate transactions, and to be
the product of a judicial feeling, sometimes hinted at but more
often unexpressed, that conditions of complexity, machination,
collusion, deceit and downright dishonesty, so often attend the
claims of real estate brokers to commissions upon unconsummated transactions in the metropolitan real estate market, as to
call for the most severe judicial scrutiny of all such claims and to
require the Courts oftentimes to do substantial justice by reaching
conclusions in particular cases which fly in the face of the rules
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of law accepted in jurisdictions where real property is less valuable and brokers are less persistent, adroit, and oftentimes unconscionable. With all deference, it may be said that in New
York the appellate Courts seem most generally to have refrained
from direct and definite discussion of the legal principles involved,
and perhaps purposely to have left those principles more or less
undefined, in order that the way might be left open for refusal
of recovery in particular cases where the outcome in the trial Court
worked injustice or gave effectiveness to fraud. At least it appears warranted to say that in instances where brokers have been
permitted to recover commissions upon unconsummated transactions, opinions have rarely been written, affirmances have
usually been without opinion, and many of the memoranda
which uphold the -broker's recovery are cryptic and skeletonized,
so far as their discussion of the law is concerned. On the other
hand, the reports contain numbers of decisions in which the brokers
were denied recovery, and in these, too, the Courts confine themselves closely to the particular facts, profess to considqr each particular case to be more or less sui generis, and proceed solemnly
to reach and state a result not at all reconcilable with the pronouncements of the Courts of other commonwealths. It seems
oftentimes to have been the actual point of view of the members
of appellate Courts in this State that as a matter of a sound, just
and workable social rule on the subject, the law should not under
any circumstances recognize the right of any real estate broker
to commissions upon any transaction where he does not induce
his employer and a prospective purchaser either to close the transaction or sign a contract in black and white, thereby leaving no
room for doubt that the broker had in fact performed the task
which he says he was employed to perform. It seems oftentimes
to be the expressed or unexpressed view of New York Courts,
that in this metropolitan community, where brokers are so numerous and persistent, languages and business methods go diversified and susceptible of varying interpretations, and property values
so enormous, it is unsafe to permit recovery upon unconsummated
transactions, in any instance where the basis of recovery hinges
wholly upon oral testimony and may rest altogether on collusive
action and glib oral asservations, on the part of an unscrupulous
broker and a supposititious "prospective purchaser." How far our
New York Courts have been influenced by local commercial conditions and how justifiable is any such hypothesis as has been indicated, in general or in particular cases, it is not within the prov-
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ince of this article to discuss; but I do not think a full and fair
understanding of the history of this legal question in this State
can be reached, without taking into account the influence of the
point of view to which I have referred.
The starting-point of any discussion of the rights of a real
estate broker to commissions is of course that such a broker is an
agent authorized and employed to make available to his employer
an indicated result. He is not employed to close a transaction,
but to enable a transaction. He does not undertake that his employer will wish to close, or be able to close, the transaction for
which his employer sent him out to procure an opposite party; he
undertakes only that he will make it possible for his employer to
close the indicated transaction on the indicated terms, if the employer continues to so desire and is in position to do so. He undertakes to procure an opposite party ready, willing and able to close
the transaction with the broker's employer on the terms which the
latter gave to the broker; he guarantees against the unwillingness
or inability of the opposite party so produced, but not against his
own employer's change of mind or developed inability actually to
close the transaction on the terms and basis committed to the
broker. Upon this foundation of fundamentals, it is of course
commonly and correctly said that the brokerage contract is one
under which the broker assumes all the risk that his effort will
not avail to accomplish the stipulated result. The owner agrees
that the broker may endeavor to find a purchaser for the property indicated by the owner upon terms also indicated by the
owner; to such a purchaser, the owner agrees to convey the property on the indicated terms, and agrees to pay the broker for making available to the owner the consummation of such a transaction.
If the broker does not do this, his best efforts go unrewarded, and
it is likewise said with entire accuracy that the broker takes all
the risk that failure of consummation will leave him without right
to recompense for his work, with the sole exception that where he
brought the parties to agreement upon terms, non-consummation
through his employer's choice or fault cannot be urged to bar his
recovery (Sibbald v. The Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378).
There is accordingly, I take it, no fair doubt in this jurisdiction,
under authorities which need not be reviewed, that a broker who
has brought to his principal a purchaser who signs an enforceable
contract to buy the property on the owner's terms, may recover,
in an action upon the brokerage contract, his agreed compensation, even though (1) his principal is unable to close the trans-
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action by conveying the property as described in the contract; or
(2) his principal refuses to complete the transaction; or (3) it appears that the principal had so mis-represented the property to
the broker and purchaser, even as to particulars not set out in the
signed contract to purchase, that the purchaser does not consummate the transaction (Glentworth v. Luther,21 Barb. 145; Condict
v. Cowdrey, 26 J. & S. 365; 5 N. Y. Supp. 187). The broker is
regarded as having produced the requisite "meeting of the minds"
between vendor and vendee when signatures are attached to a contract to buy on the terms on which he had been employed to find
a purchaser, and no change of mind, inability, mis-representation,
or other act or fault on the part of the owner, can then change.
the fact that the broker has performed the task for whose performance the owner agreed to pay.
It has likewise been commonly held that the broker is entitled
to his compensation where the owner's authorization asked him to
procure an able pur,4 laser for accuratelyrepresented property upon
indicated terms, and the owner refuses to contract or convey when
the broker produces a purchaser willing to sign a contract and
meet the terms as indicated for the property as represented. There
being under such circumstances no difference between the property as described to the broker and the property as actually owned
and conveyable, the broker is again regarded as having completed
his undertaking under the brokerage contract, in making available
to the owner the consummation of such a sale as his employment
contemplated, and his employer is not permitted to urge the latter's
own choice or fault to defeat his agreement to pay for a stipulated
result. The minds of the parties are regarded as having met
when the broker, in behalf of his principal, offers the property
upon the terms stated by the owner and the potential purchaser
accepts those terms without qualification, and the broker and purchaser place before the owner the latter's readiness and'ability to
buy on the terms communicated to the broker. Recovery under
the brokerage contract is accordingly sanctioned.
But what of the broker whose best efforts bring about no signing of a contract, no production of a purchaser willing to fulfill
the owner's terms for the property as it actually is-the broker
whose principal sends him forth on a task which can never result
in enforceable contract; the broker who procures a purchaser will-.
ing to sign and carry out a contract, on the owner's terms, for the
property as described by the owner to the broker and so in turn
to the purchaser, only to find that the property which the owner
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could contract to convey differs greatly from the property which
the owner had, by the terms of his authorization, sent the broker
forth to sell? It will be noted that the issue no longer concerns
the owner's refusal or failure to consummate a transaction which
could have been closed but for his change of mind, or even his
inability to convey property as described in a signed contract to
convey. The broker never procured a person willing to buy what
the owner in fact had to sell; he only procured a purchaser for the
property for which his employer, by the terms and descriptions
contained in the broker's authorization, asked him to procure a
purchaser. May the broker recover, under the equitable doctrine
of the Sibbald case, in an action on the contract or for damages,
or may the employer urge his own mis-statements, wilful or otherwise, to defeat the compensation of an employee who has done
what he was asked to do and has made possible the result which
he was asked to make possible, only to find that the result is one
which, as between his employer and a third person, cannot be
carried out?
What answer do the New York Courts make to these queries?
May the plaintiff broker recover his commissions from the inaccurate or fraudulently mis-representing owner? I have already
referred to the apparent divergence from the general view, which
has commonly characterized the approach of New York City tribunals to this juristic problem. The Supreme Court of the United
States has drawn a clear distinction between fulfillment of the
brokerage contract and consummation of the contract to buy and
sell, and has resolved the present question in favor of the broker
(Dotson v. Milliken, 209 U. S. 237) ; the rule in most of the States
is in apparent accord (Hannan v. Moran, 71 Mich. 261; 38 N. W.
909; Hugill v. Weekley,
W. Va.,
; 61 S. .
360; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1262; Lewis v. Mansfield Grain
& Elevator Co.,
Texas Civ. App.
; 21 S. W. 585;
Roberts v. Kimmons, 65 Miss. 332; 3 South. 736; Conkling v.
Krakrauer, 70 Texas, 735; 11 S. W. 117; Gillespie v. Dick, Texas
Civ. App.
; 111 S. W. 664; Middleton v. Thonpson, 163 Pa.
112; 29 Atl. 796; Sweeney v. Oil & Gas Co., 130 Pa. 193; Keys
v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42; contra, but distinguishable, Crockett v.
Grayson, 98 Va. 354; 36 S. E. 477). It should, however, be said
that in the Hughill, Lewis, Roberts, and Gillespie cases, supra,
the owner and purchaser had entered into written contracts before the owner's mis-representations were discovered; only in the
Pennsylvania cases is there a square holding that the failure to
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reach the point of a written contract is inconsequential. The
New York Court of Appeals has not passed upon the question,
but Curtis v. Mott, (90 Hun, 439; appeal dismissed, 158 N. Y.
663), Diamond & Co. v. Hartley, (38 App. Div. 87; 47 App. Div.
1), French v. Brush-Swan El. Light Co., (39 N. Y. St. Repr.
515), Hausman v. Hertfelder, (81 App. Div. 46; appeal withdrawn, 177 N. Y. 567, and Keough v. Meyer, (127 App. Div.
273), are relied upon as declaring, in this metiopolitan area where
the multiplicity of the real estate operations and the magnitude
of the property values involved have been deemed to call for the
severest judicial scrutiny of claims for commissions upon unconsummated transactions, a concept of the brokerage contract adverse to the broker's claim.
The query as to the New York rule came pointedly before me
some months ago in an action entitled Nelson, Lee and Green,
Inc. v. Daly (N. Y. Law Journal, February 3, 1917; 163 N. Y.
; not yet officially reported). Inasmuch as that case
Supp.
is no longer pending in the Courts, I may use it as illustration,
-because it embodied the elements of the analysis to be made of
the New York cases on the subject. The brokerage contract sued
on in the case dealt with the procuring of a tenant for a longterm lease, but no difference in essential principle is involved, as
between lease and purchase. The plaintiff was a corporation engaged in the business of real estate brokerage. On June 27, 1916,
the defendants, owners of real property at Third Avenue and
Thirtieth Street, in the Borough of Manhattan, asked the plaintiff to procure for them a tenant, upon indicated terms of indenture. Admittedly no lease or .contract was ever entered into between the defendants and any tenant procured by the plaintiff,
but the latter insisted that it made available to the owner exactly
and fully the result for which the defendants, by the terms of the
brokerage contract, offered and agreed to pay a commission and
that the broker could not be refused his commissions merely because the property which the owner sought to lease to the proposed tenant was found to vary materially from the property for
which the broker was employed to, and did, procure an acceptable
tenant.
The case was before the Court upon the allegations of the
complaint and of the opening address of the plaintiff's counsel.
For the purposes of this article, those averments will of necessity
be deemed true. At the time the plaintiff was employed and as
a part of the letter of authorization, the defendants represented
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to the plaintiff that, among other things, the rentals at that time
being received from the premises were in excess of $7,000. per
year. He then went ahead and found a tenant willing to lease
such a property on the indicated terms. All the details of the
lease were agreed upon between the tenant and the defendants;
the latters' lawyers drew a lease embodying the terms on which
the defendants were willing to enter into a 21-year lease with the
tenant; this proposed lease was acceptable, in substance and form,
to, and accepted by, the tenant procured by the plaintiff, and the
lease was sent to the tenant for execution. As a part, however,
of what the defendants had told the plaintiff's representative
about the property, the latter had in turn informed the prospective tenant that the current receipts in" rentals exceeded $7,000.
per year. The plaintiff repeatedly asked the defendants for an
itemized statement of the rentals, so that the same might be furnished the tenant, but the defendants delayed compliance, assured the plaintiff that the annual rentals in fact exceeded $7,600.,
and said that an itemized statement would be furnished before
the tenant was asked actually to execute the agreed form of lease.
When the lease went to the tenant for signature, with it went for
the first time an itemized statement of the actual receipt from
rent. Admittedly this revealed yearly collections of about $6,200.,
rather than $7,000. or $7,600. The prospective tenant, in the
light of this disclosure, did not want such a property at all upon
the owner's terms, although he had been ready and willing, and
acceptable, for a closing on those terms until he discovered that
the rentals were not in the sum represented by the owners to the
broker and by the broker to the proposed lessee. The deal thereupon fell through, and the plaintiff's work availed nothing.
Under the circumstances stated, it is obvious that no contract
or obligation, between owner and proposed tenant, was at any
time brought into being or even rendered possible. The broker
did bring the owners and the proposed tenant to agreement upon
all the terms of rental, payments, repair covenants, and the like,
which were to go in the proposed lease, but -there was no meeting
of the minds and no mutual readiness to close on those terms,
because the owners had offered those terms as to a property which
was in fact yielding less than $6,200. per year and the proposed
tenant had accepted those terms only as to a property yielding
$7,600. per year. Not the owners, but the proposed tenant, refused to consummate the transaction by signing a mutually acceptable form of contract; the owners were at all times willing to
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lease their property at the rental and on the terms which the
tenant had accepted; the broker never produced a tenant actually
willing to close for the particular property on the contract terms.
Can it be said, in this State, that, as between the broker and his
employer, the former fulfilled his contractual undertaking and
is entitled to recover, despite the proposed tenant's refusal to consummate a contract with the owner?
Answer to that query involves analysis of the authorities as
to several mooted points affecting the brokerage contract. Does
the owner's description of the property the broker is employed to
sell enter into and become a part of the brokerage contract, so
that his undertaking is to find a purchaser for such a property?
What is the subject-matter of the contract between owner and
broker-the owner's property as it actually is or the property as
the owner describes it? Under the brokerage contract, who takes
the risk of the owner's misrepresetitations as to his property,
wilful or otherwise? Does the broker "assume the risk" of that,
too? And what constitutes performance of the brokerage contract-making available a sale of such a property as the owner
sent the broker out to sell, or nothing short of the signing of an
enforceable contract to buy the property actually owned? If
less than the latter can ever be effectual performance of the
brokerage contract, could it be said that in this State the plaintiff
in the Daly case had not done that for which a commission was
to be paid?
Curtis v. Mott (90 Hun, 432), chiefly relied upon by those
who would deny to the broker recovery of commissions, proceeds
plainly on the hypothesis that the broker assumes the risk of the
owner's misrepresentations and performs his contract only if the
third person, willing to accede to the owner's terms for the property as it was represented by the owner, proves willing also to
fulfill the same terms for the property as it proves in fact to be.
In Curtis v. Mott, decided by the General Term for the First
Department in 1895, the plaintiff as broker had been employed to
sell the defendant's property at a fixed price, at a rate of commission agreed upon. He produced a man who would have bought
it at the seller's terms provided the monthly rentals at the time
had been equal to those represented to him by the broker. The
seller, in response to an inquiry of him by the broker, had stated
the monthly rentals to have been $510., whereas they were in
fact $488. No contract was signed, for the sole reason that the
purchaser would not pay the agreed price for a property renting
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for so much less than he had been told. Mr. Justice Alton B.
Parker, with whom concurred Presiding Justice Van Brunt, ruled
that "under the authorities in this State, it was necessary for him,
in order to earn his commissions, to produce a purchaser who
should be ready and willing to purchase the property upon the
would-be seller's terms" and that this the broker had not done.
"Whether in a proper action this plaintiff could recover damages,"
added the prevailing opinion, "because of misrepresentations
which prevented performance of his contract, we need not consider, as that question is not before us." Mr. Justice Morgan J.
O'Brien dissented, but the majority held that the judgment could
not stand, "although it may well be that in this particular instance
it works substantial justice." In the Court of Appeals on January 16, 1899, the appeal was dismissed without argument, and the
holding of the General Term has been at no time reversed or in
terms rejected. In at least one instance it has been cited and followed in the First Department (Hausman v. Herdtfelder, 81 App.
Div. 46).
The sole authority cited in Curtis v. Mott is hardly helpful.
It in fact does not relate to the present issue at all. In French v.
Brush-Swan El. Lt. Co. (39 N. Y. St. Repr. 515; General Term,
1st Dept., 1891), the plaintiff was authorized, by letter, to procure a purchaser for certain electric lighting processes and appliances. He found a purchaser who was willing to buy on condition that the process, after tests, should be found to do as represented. Although the purchaser refused to buy when the process
failed to stand the test, the broker sought recovery of his compensation. It was held, with obvious correctness, that the plaintiff had only procured a purchaser willing to buy on conditions
subsequently unfulfilled, and that the owners' representations as
to what the process would do, contained in a "circular to agents"
were not so incorporated in the brokerage contract as to enable
the broker to claim performance merely by procuring a purchaser
willing to buy in the event the statements of the circular proved
true under future tests.
In Diamond Co. v. Hartley, the issue was presented to the Appellate Division for the Second Department in 1899 (38 App. Div.
87) and for the First Department in 1900 (47 App. Div. 1). Here
also there was no contract sigped, though a contract was drawn,
in a form mutually acceptable. When the time came for signing,
it developed that the owner had stated the property to be four and
one-half inches wider than it in fact was, and the proposed con-
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tract had been drawn by the owner's counsel with the incorrect
width as a part of the description. The abstract showed the true
facts; the proposed purchaser refused to accept a modification
to conform to the actual width unless an allowance were made
him; and the transaction fell through. The decision of the First
Department, adverse to the broker's recovery, appears to have
been based upon the fact that the owner was not seeking to sell
his property and had given information of its width only most
casually to the broker's representative who approached him with
a request for a statement of the price at which he would be willing to sell. It did not appear that the mis-statement was intentional, much less fraudulent, that the owner had any idea any one
would act on it or rely on it, or that the broker's representative
understood the, information to be a warranty of width. All the
indications were regarding as warranting the inference that "what
the plaintiff went to buy and what the defendant authorized him
to sell was the house No. 17 West Thirtieth Street as it stood, and
for that house as it stood these plaintiffs have never procured a
purchaser willing to purchase upon the defendant's terms," and
the learned Court so held. Under the circumstances, it could
hardly be said that the owner's casual statement became an integral
part of the brokerage contract.
This carefully limited pronouncement of the First Department is perhaps significant, in view of the fact that the year before,
in the same controversy, the Second Department had based a
similar outcome upon a more sweeping generalization. That
Court, through Mr. Justice Woodward, declared that
"The law of this case seems to be well settled; the plaintiff must be able to establish that it has produced a party
able and willing to take the property at the defendant's own
terms; and to do this it must show that the parties to the
transaction have reached an enforcible agreement as between themselves."
The Court quoted with approval, and held applicable, the statement in Platt v. Kohler (65 Hun, 557, 559), that
"The plaintiff's right to payment depended upon his
procuring a person ready and willing to contract in such
a way as to be legally bound to perform. His service was
incomplete until that was done.

.

.

.

Where

.

.

.

the party produced by the broker refuses to conform thereto
by entering into a binding obligation, the broker has failed
to effect the purpose of his employment."
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Under the ruling of the Second Department in this case, it
would seem: (1) that the subject-matter of the brokerage contract is the same as that of the ultimately possible contract between
the owner and purchaser, viz., not the property described by the
owner to the broker, but the property which the owner could in
fact convey; and (2) that the broker can recover his commissions
only by showing that the owner and purchaser entered into a
mutually enforceable agreement or that the purchaser was willing
to buy, on the indicated terms, the property actually demisable by
the owner and that the owner refused to contract to convey that
property upon those terms.
Hausman v. Herdtfelder (81 App. Div. 46; appeal withdrawn,
177 N. Y. 567) must be regarded as authority for the proposition
that the broker assumes all the risk of the frustration of his efforts
by the owner's misrepresentations, and that he becomes entitled
to his commissions only by procuring a purchaser willing to take
the property as it actually is, regardless whether he procures a
purchaser ready to close for such a property as the owner's description authorized him to sell. 'That case was decided by the
First Department in 1903, upon specific citation of Curtis v. Matt,
Diamond Co. v. Hartley, and French v. Brush-Swan El. Lt. Co.,
above referred to. The proposed purchaser had refused to sign
a contract because it called for a deed of property ten feet less in
depth than the aged defendant had stated the property to be, to
the broker at the time of the brokerage contract, and to the purchaser. The Court held, through Laughlin, J., that under the
facts disclosed, the plaintiff "was employed, not to sell a certain
number of feet of land, but the premises as they were occupied
and with which he was familiar.

.

.

.

Assuming

.

that she did inform him that the lot was 76 feet in depth, that -was
at most a mere representation and not a warranty."
To similar effect is Keough v. Mayer (127 App. Div. 275),
decided by the Second Department in 1908, upon the cited authority of the two cases last above discussed. The ov*ner had inaccurately stated the frontage of the property, at the time he employed the broker, and -to the proposed purchaser. The Court
ruled, through Gaynor, J., that the statement to the broker "did
not enter into the contract of employment. It was to get a purchaser for the plot just as it was." And the learned Court strangely
added: "If the defendants afterwards told the proposed purchaser during the negotiation that the frontage was 168 feet, that
did not change the contract of brokerage."
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Is it to be concluded from the foregoing cases that there is in
this State no influential authority in support of the Federal rule
(Dotson v. Milliken, 209 U. S. 237)? On the contrary, there is
an impressive line of well-considered cases which find startingpoint in the lucid expressions of Judge Finch in Sibbald v. The
Bethlehem Iron Co. (83 N. Y. 378) and proceed in discreet disregard of the precedents already reviewed. In the Sibbald case, decided in 1881, the Court of Appeals said that "the duty of the
broker consisted in bringing the minds of the vendor and vendee
to an agreement," the production of "a purchaser ready and willing to enter into a contract on the employer's terms," "the meeting
of their minds, produced by the agency of the broker. The risk
of failure is wholly his . . . This, however, must be taken
with one important and necessary limitation. If the efforts of
the broker are rendered a failure by some fault of the employer
S
. .then
the broker does not lose his commissions. And
that upon the familiar principle that no one can avail himself of
the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has himself
occasioned its non-performance." Nothing in the Sibbald case
held or indicated that the broker might recover where there had
been no contract or where the purchaser had refused to contract
to buy the physical premises actually owned, but the rule of frustration through the owner's fault has at times been liberally
applied.
In Cohen v. Farley (28 Misc. 168), decided by the Appellate
Term in 1899, the owner stated to the broker, orally and on a
card given at the time of his employment, that the property was
23 feet wide. The broker brought a purchaser; a price and terms
were agreed upon; a contract was drawn; but before signature
it was found to relate only to the 22 feet, 7 inches, actually owned.
In allowing the broker to recover commissions, the Court held,
through Freedman, P. J., that the broker and the proposed purchaser had relied and acted, and had. a right to rely and act, on
the owner's statement and the printed card, and that "the size of
the lot was an important element in the contract between" the
owner and the broker. Diamond Co. v. Hartley (supra) was commented on, in an effort to distinguish that case on the ground that
it appeared therein that the owner's statements were casual and not
for the .purpose of inducing anyone to consider purchasing the
property.
In Seidman v. Rauner (51 Misc. 10), decided in 1906, the same
Court held, through Leventritt, J., that where the owner had given
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the purchaser an "option" but no enforceable contract had been
signed, the broker's recovery was not barred, if it appeared that
the purchaser was willing to close for the property as described in
the "option" but the owner had therein misrepresented the terms
of mortgage. To the same effect is Frank v. Connor (107 N. Y.
Supp. "133), decided by the same Court a year later. "The nonexecution of a formal contract cannot defeat the plaintiff," added
the Court.
Goodman v. Hess (56 Misc. 482) was also decided by the
Appellate Term in 1907, and is closely in point. The authorization to the broker was upon a printed form, and in it appeared the
purchase price and particulars of the property. The annual rental
was materially misstated. The broker procured a purchaser willing to buy on the stipulated terms the property described, but not
the property with rentals $264. less. No contract was signed, and
the transaction fell through. The Court held, through Erlanger,
J., thaV
"The refusal of the purchaser to complete because of the
defendant's misrepresentations as to the rental value cannot defeat the claim for commissions. Defendant cannot
urge.his own wrong and thus deprive the broker of the commissions earned by him. But for his misrepresentation as
to the rental the contract of sale would have been signed."
In Hess v. Investors and Traders' Realty Co. (67 Misc. 390),
decided by the Appellate Term in 1910, the learned Court, per
Lehman, J., very carefully limited, to the precise facts passed upon,
the decisions in the Diamond Co., Hausman, and Keough cases,
hereinbefore reviewed. The broker had been employed to procure a purchaser for a single plot of ground "45 x 100 feet." The
employer and the purchaser agreed on terms and entered into a
contract which provided, in substance, that the purchaser should
have the right to reject title and refuse to close, in the event the
owner was not able to deliver title to a contiguous plot such as he
had described to the broker and had covenanted to convey. The
Court held that the broker had performed the task which his employer hired him to perform, and that "the question of the defendant's liability is to be considered from the standpoint of what
the broker engages to do. (Alt. v. D.oscher, 102 App. Div. 344;
affd. on opinion below, 186 N. Y. 566.)
In Putnam v. Berger (95 App. Div. 62), a per curiam opinion
was filed by the Second Department in 1904. The owner, as here,
gave the broker a written authorization to sell. In that writing,
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the owner stated that possession could be given at once. The
owner and the proposed purchaser came to agreement on price
and terms, but the transaction failed because the owner could not
give immediate possession. The Court held that a judgment for
the broker was warranted, because he brought his employer a purchaser willing to buy on the-represented terms, and his right could
not be defeated because one of those representations was incorrect.
A significant comment upon Hausman v. Herdtfelder (supra)
emanated from the Second Department in Sotsky v. Ginsburg
(129 App. Div. 441), decided in 1908. In the Sotsky case, the
owners had represented, to the broker and to the proposed purchaser, that the lot had a frontage of something over 75 feet. The
broker procured a purchaser for such a property at the owners'
price, but before the contract was signed, the owners decided they
wanted more money, though it had been discovered that the frontage was only 72 feet. The purchaser offered to pay nevertheless
the original price for the plot as it was, but refused to pay the
advanced price. The broker was held to have fulfilled his undertaking, and Woodward, J., added:
"The defendants now contend that this case is brought
within the rule laid down in Hausnan v. Herdtfelder (81
App. Div. 46) and that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
Without considering how far that case might be regarded
as controlling under its own particularfacts, it is sufficient
to point out that in that case the parties never came to an
agreement, while in the case at bar they did; the plaintiff's
proposed purchaser not only agreed to take the premises at
the price and terms suggested by the defendants at the
original meeting, but after the defendants had repudiated
their contract and, demanded an increase, he was still ready,
willing and able to take the premises with the shortage of
three feet frontage at the original terms. Under such circumstances it is not to be questioned that the brokers had
earned their commissions; this was done at the first meeting
of the parties"a statement significant in view of the fact that at this meeting no
contract was signed or drawn, and the purchaser was offering to
buy for $160,000. a 75-foot frontage and the owners were offering
to sell a Z5-foot frontage, although the owners had, and could
convey, only a 72 foot frontage, with the result that it cannot be
said that there was at any time a meeting of the minds as to a
frontage which the owner could actually have conveyed. The
broker had performed his contract with his employer, and was
allowed to recover, even though his employer and the prospective
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purchaser never reached an actual or enforceable agreement, as
between themselves.
The latest decision of any appellate Court on the subject seems
to be Schweid v. Storandt (157 App. Div. 855), which had a welllitigated course in the Fourth Department (see, also, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 1141; affirmance without opinion, 139 N. Y. Supp. 1144;
leave to go to Court of Appeals refused; reargument granted, 155
App. Div. 947; appeal decided, 157 App. Div. 855). Robson, J.,
wrote for the majority of the Court, and with him concurred McLennan, P. J., and Kruse and Lambert, JJ.; Foote, J., dissented
The majority quoted with approval the declaration of Sibbald v.
Bethlehem Iron Co. (supra) and specifically adopted the rule of
Dotson v. Milliken (209 U. S. 237); the dissenting opinion was
based specifically upon Curtis v. Mott and the other precedents
above reviewed as in accord therewith. The owner had employed
the plaintiffs to procure a purchaser for a certain apartment building in Rochester, at a price of $50,000., and the broker procured a
purchaser ready to buy at the price. No enforceable agreement
between the principals was ever entered into, but the plaintiffs
nevertheless claimed their commissions. Some months after the
brokerage contract and while the plaintiffs were endeavoring 'to
find a purchaser, the owner had furnished a written statement of
the number of apartments and the sums for which they were
separately rented.
After the parties reached accord on essential terms, the substantial incorrectness of the information thus imparted to broker
and customer was disclosed, and the transaction fell through.
The owner's misstatements as to rental, although made months
after tle brokerage contract, was held to be "treated and considered in relation to the original contract of agency the same as
if they had been actually included therein."
The Court added, upon the authority of Dotson v. Milliken
(supra), that
"If it (the mis-statement of rental) had been contained
in the original contract of agency there could be little doubt
that, if false and the agent relying upon the truthfulness
of the representation and having secured an able and willing
purchaser who also relied upon the truthfulness of the repsentations, and who on learning their falsity for that reason
refused to purchase, the agent would have earned his commissions."
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Upon this point, the minority opinion significantly said:

"The cases of Hess v. Investors & Traders' Realty Co.
(67 Misc. 390) and Dotson v. Milliken (209 U. S. 237)
are cases where the owner's mis-representations as to his
property were made to the broker at the time of his employment, and, hence, entered into the contract of employment.
The distinction between these cases and the one before us
is apparent."
What conclusion is to be reached from this conflict of decisions?
As to my personal view, I can perhaps do not better than to quote
my determination in the Daly case (supra), to the following effect:
"Upon a survey of the whole subject, I am of the opinion that where the owner makes to the broker a definite
representation with respect to the current rentals of the
property, and makes it, whether as a part of the original
authorization or not, under such circumstahces as clearly
to import the owner's knowledge that his statements
to the broker are to be used by the latter in procuring a
purchaser for the property so described, the better-supported rule is that the broker fulfills his task by procuring
an acceptable purchaser for the property as so described,
and is not barred of recovery because the prospective purchaser will not meet the owner's terms for the property as
it actually is. To reach a contrary view would be to violate
the fundamental concept so clearly stated in the Sibbald
case, that he who asserts the non-performance of a condition precedent, cannot urge non-performance occasioned by
his own act or fault, and that he who employs an agent to
enable himself to secure a given result cannot defeat the
agent's claim to compensation by asserting that his own
carelessness or fraud sent the agent out to enable a result
which the employer could not consummate. Analysis of the
authorities seems to warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff
at bar has sufficiently performed his contract with the
defendants, and is entitled to have a jury pass upon his
claim for compensation.
"The suggestion that the broker's redress must be
sought in an action for damages for fraudulent representations, rather than upon the brokerage contract, seems to
place emphasis upon the form of action rather than the substance of right. Besides, no fraudulent intent may have
entered into mis-statements which set the broker at work
on his futile task, and even when fraud is present, what is
the measure of the damage proximately caused? If it be
true, as the Supreme Court of the United States has held
(Dotson v. Milliken, supra), that performance of the brokerage contract does not necessarily import a resultant signing
of a contract between the owner and prospective purchaser,
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the broker's rights seem fairly to spring from his contract
with his employer and the fair estoppel of the latter from
denying that the brokerage contract is performed by the
production of an acceptable purchaser for the property as
described by the owner. Nor is it possible to give efficacy
to the plea that sanction of the Federal rule will lead, in
New York City, unscrupulous brokers to act in collusion
with supposititiously "ready" purchasers, in mulcting owners through false claims of inaccurate descriptions followed
by simulated readiness to meet the owner's terms for property as thus mis-represented. If the rule is to be limited to
statements contained in written authorization, signed and
delivered at the time the broker is employed, that would
seem to be a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,
promulgation of the acceptable public policy. In any event,
the mis-representations here complained of were in writing, were an integral and physical part of the brokerage
contract, and were persisted in despite repeated requests
for the detailed information which would seasonably have
disclosed their inaccuracy. The present case therefore
stands on ground as to which the majority and minority
alike in Schweid v. Storandt (supra), held a common view."
It may be added that, following the foregoing determination in
the Daly case, no appeal was taken by the defendant owners. The
controversy was settled between the parties, without an appellate
determination of the correctness of the ruling above quoted. If
my ruling in that case was error, that will remain to be established
in some other case. I have thus far found no reason, however,
to change the views therein expressed, or to doubt that the eventual
ruling of the New York Court of Appeals will sustain the right
of the broker to redress, under the circumstances discussed in this
article. Where the elements of false and fraudulent statement by
the owners are clearly present, I am inclined to the belief that, so
far as the question under discussion is concerned, the broker would
be on more surely solid legal ground, if his action were made to
sound in damages for fraudulent inducing of action and effort.
His difficulty under that theory of action, however, would appear
to be in proving proximate damages from the owner's mis-statements of fact. What would be his measure of recovery? The
reasonable value of the efforts he was induced to put forth?
Hardly his commissions for effecting the sale of the property
actually owned but fraudulently mis-represented, because it does
not appear that if the owner had accurately represented the property, the broker would have procured a purchaser at all. If this
be the theory of the broker's recovery, may he not have as dam-
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ages the reasonable value of the efforts expended, irrespective
whether he procured any prospective purchaser or not, if only it
appears that the owner fraudulently misrepresented the property
to him as a part of the statements inducing him to labor to bring
about a sale. Upon the whole matter, I remain of the opinion that,
whether or not the owner's mis-statements are wilful and fraudulent, the broker performs his brokerage contract by producing a
ready and able purchaser for such a property as the owner described in his authorization to the broker, and that the latter may
therefore recover his commissions in an action upon the brokerage
contract.

WM. L.
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